CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 318

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

2.

AIR SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The Committee considered a memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade (QPD(67) 84) about air services ncgotiations with the

Soviet Union.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE said that a delegation of

British officials was due to begin a visit to Moscow on 27th November

for discussions with Soviet aeronautical authorities about the possible

expansion of air services between and beyond the two countries. The

main interest for us in these discussions would be to attempt to secure

agreement on satisfactory terms for the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) to operate across Siberia on a route from London to

Tokyo. This was much the shortest route from Western Europe to Japan

and the gain in revenue to BOAC over a four-year period of operations

from a share in such a route was estimated at £12 million, much of which

would be in foreign currency. Although no foreign aircraft were at present allowed to operate across Siberia, AEROFLOT, the Soviet National

Airline had recently started a service on a joint basis with Japan air-

lines between Moscow and Tokyo with an understanding that Japanese air- craft would be able to use the route themselves, probably by 1969.

The Scandinavian countries were understood to have been promised that

they would be able to use the Siberian route when this was opened to

foreign aircraft in return for allowing Soviet aircraft to cross or land

in Scandinavia on services to North America, including Cuba. Other

European countries, notably France, were active in trying to use the

route; if BQAC were unable to obtain a share in it they would be at a

great disadvantage.

If we were to obtain a share in the route across Siberia, we should have to grant new operating rights to AEROFLOT which the Soviet

Union would regard as worthwhile; these would have to be on routes

across the Atlantic. Although we could readily offer such arrangements on

routes through this country to the mainland of North America, it appeared

that AEROFLOT plans envisaged direct operation between Moscow and Montreal

or New York; we ought therefore to consider other possibilities that

might satisfy the Soviet Union. One possibility was that the Russians would

be interested in staging facilities on a route across Scandinavia to Cuba, and although this might cause difficulties for us with the United States and Venezuela, we did not consider that the risk of retaliation by them against us was such that we should not be ready to explore this possibility if the Soviet Union were to raise it; it was well known that our policy was to trade with Cuba and this had been accepted by the

United States albeit under protesto

CONFIDENTIAL

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